Wednesday, July 9, 2014

I, robot

Richard Dawkins once said:

Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

Imagine a genius inventor is able to manufacture a human android. Say an android like David 8 in Ridley Scott's Prometheus. But far better (e.g. sans white colored blood, etc.). Indistinguishable from an actual human being.

Of course, one could ask, is David a "living" organism? But given the beliefs and worldview of someone like Richard Dawkins or Jerry Coyne (e.g. atheism, materialism, reductionism, neo-Darwinism), would there be a substantial difference between David and a living, breathing human being like Dawkins?

If so, what would it be?

If not, then how would an evolutionist like Dawkins differentiate between a "living" human being which evolved and David who is an artificial creation? Say the inventor is the only other who knows and he's not telling! Neither is David.

After all, both appear designed. But real humans (e.g. Dawkins) have come to appear designed due to unguided and purposeless natural processes, whereas artificial humans like David have come to appear designed due to the guided and purposeful intelligence of a genius inventor. That is, real humans have the appearance of design, while artificial humans have in fact been designed.

This scenario may sound far-fetched to many people; it's in the realm of science fiction, naught else. Maybe so. But given Dawkins' worldview, why not...someday? Indeed, Craig Venter "created" artificial life not too long ago. Apparently Venter had even placed a genetic signature or watermark in his synthetic life in order to make it known it was his creation. Not unlike, perhaps, Mr. Weyland placing "W" on the fingertip of his creation David in Prometheus:

So, short of some sort of a watermark or signature in the cell, if it's not possible to distinguish between a real human being and an artificially designed human being, then how could we tell one did indeed evolve according to unguided and purposeless natural processes, whereas the other was intelligently designed?

If we can't, then an outsider might as well conclude David evolved according to evolutionary theory, whereas Dawkins was designed by a genius inventor. But we don't really know because we can't distinguish between the two.

As such, on what grounds could Dawkins aka the Dawkbot say humans merely have the "appearance" of design rather than actual design? Couldn't it go either way? If so, then Dawkins shouldn't be so quick to pronounce the appearance of design over actual intelligent design.

A quick and dirty intro to ID

This is just a quick and dirty intro to Intelligent Design (ID).

Obviously, I think it'd be best for people to go straight to the source and read about ID directly from websites like Uncommon Descent and Evolution News & Views. To say nothing of the plethora of published works by ID theorists William Dembski, Stephen Meyer, Michael Behe, et al.

However, since I've had friends and others ask me to explain ID, I thought it'd be worth summarizing what I think is the main point of ID to them.


Francis Crick, who co-discovered the structure of DNA along with James Watson, once said:

Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved.

By the same token, the militant atheist and evolutionist Richard Dawkins has said:

Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

As ID theorists have pointed out, the key word is "appearance." Individuals like Dawkins believe living organisms merely "appear" to have been designed when in fact they are anything but. They believe living organisms have instead come into being via unguided and purposeless natural processes. And that these natural processes are best explicated in neo-Darwinism.

By contrast, a reason ID theorists use the term "intelligent" in ID is because they wish to distinguish between an unguided and purposeless natural process vs a guided and purposeful process best explained by intelligent agency.

Now, virtually everyone recognizes there are many things in this universe which look like they're designed. Obviously we know things like computers, cars, and buildings have been engineered by humans. Likewise, various works of art, literature, music, movies, computer games. Similarly, we could say many inorganic materials like various plastics have been artificially designed. We could further include nanoparticles and arguably the synthetic elements in the Periodic Table too. Almost everyone including atheists like Dawkins would probably agree most if not all of these have been designed by intelligent agents i.e. humans.

But when it comes to living organisms, while everyone agrees life looks designed, atheists like Dawkins think actual design is an illusion. (I suppose in some ways similar to how some atheists think of consciousness.)

Worse, they practically become apoplectic if anyone so much as hints the design may not be an illusion but may in fact be actual design by an actual intelligence of some sort. That it may not have been unguided and purposeless after all. Or to put it another, if anyone casts doubt on the neo-Darwinian paradigm.

As an aside, it often seems as if it's all but a thought-crime to question Darwinism. This isn't hyperbolic language for effect, I don't think. There have been very real and unfortunate consequences. For example, many people's reputations have been unfairly marred. Many have lost their jobs and thus livelihoods and/or been blacklisted from future jobs due to their dissent from Darwinism. For starters, check out what happened to Richard Sternberg and Guillermo Gonzalez.

Getting back to the point, given living organisms appear designed, the next logical question should be: are living organisms, in fact, designed? Not: how or by what mechanisms have living organisms come to appear designed? Nor: who or what designed living organisms? (Dawkins, Coyne, Wolpert, and their kind react as equally irked by theistic evolution as they do by ID theory.) Yet neo-Darwinists often get ahead of themselves and confuse and/or conflate these and other questions and their related issues. They proceed, for example, to shout down ID theorists as Young Earth Creationists (YEC) in disguise, even though it's clear to anyone with a modicum of fair-mindedness and an ounce of familiarity with the movement that ID most decidedly is not. (Sometimes to the chagrin of many actual YECs!) Of course, these are good questions to ask, and questions which we should ask. But my immediate point is ID doesn't strictly speaking deal with these questions, not as their first port of call.

So, how can we tell if a living organism is truly designed? This is where intelligence comes in. Indeed, intelligence is what makes the crucial difference between the mere appearance of design vs actual design. In other words, there's a significant distinction between unintelligent design vs intelligent design, for unintelligent design means an unguided and purposeless natural process (i.e. neo-Darwinian theory), while intelligent design is, as I've already noted, the reverse.

Specifically, according to ID theorists, intelligence is a causal power that can arrange and adapt means to bring about teleological ends. This stands in distinction both to brute necessity which does not arrange or adapt means as well as to random chance which is not teleological or goal-oriented.

What's more, ID theorists have come up with ways to detect intelligence. I think Dembski's scheme is the most analytically rigorous. It'd be beyond the scope of this post to go into detail, but Dembski does point out three marks of intelligence: contingency, complexity, and specificity. By contingency he simply means if an object or event is unnecessary or, if you like, optional; if it occurred, even though it need not have occurred. Complexity refers to the fact that an object or event is difficult to reproduce by chance alone. And specificity is if an object or event exhibits an independent pattern. Dembski terms his theory of intelligence detection, specified complexity, and argues only intelligence can originate or generate specified complexity when prior to intelligence there was no specified complexity. Note this isn't the same as unintelligent natural processes making use of specified complexity.

If specified complexity is successful, then at a minimum it means we have sound and reasonable scientific and mathematical criteria to detect intelligent design in nature.

Parsing Parsons

Keith Parsons recently wrote:

neurons are classical not quantum objects

What's Parsons attempting to say here? Is he referring to classical mechanics in physics as opposed to quantum mechanics?

If not, I'm not sure what he's talking about.

But if so, then presumably he's attempting to say something like (in his own clumsy way) the physiology of neurons or neurophysiology isn't best explained by quantum mechanics, but rather by classical mechanics?

If so, for starters we can say that, generally speaking, quantum effects are more pronounced the smaller an object is. But just because neurons (i.e. nerve cells) aren't, say, atomic or subatomic particles doesn't necessarily mean QM has zero effect on neurons. A quantum effect could still be present but simply not observable. At least not by our current instruments or technology.

Further, neurons are obviously comprised of smaller constituents which could be measurably subject to QM (e.g. perhaps some proteins, perhaps the electron transport chain in the mitochondrial membrane).

Besides, isn't Parsons a reductionist who also subscribes to emergent phenomena in their lower level constituents? If so, wouldn't Parsons think lower level constituents in neurons could influence the higher level neurons themselves in some fashion?

Also, even if we don't head down to a low level like the atomic or subatomic level but instead stick with the molecular or cellular level, we know nerve signals are transmitted via nerve cells or neurons electrochemically (i.e. via electrical action potentials and chemical neurotransmitters). And I don't see why certain events in this electrochemical transmission process between neurons couldn't be explicated in terms of QM? (Well, maybe only if the time scale isn't short enough.)

Of course, none of this is at all to suggest I agree with the position that QM fully explains consciousness. Rather, I'm just responding to Parsons on his own terms.

This article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy may also be of interest to some.

Background to pop gen

Here's some quick and dirty background info for those curious about population genetics. It'll be simplified for wider popular appeal, but hopefully not overly simplified. I won't talk about population genetics itself, per se, since that'd be a bit too time-consuming for me to provide right now. But the background should provide enough knowledge to get people started on learning about population genetics on their own.

1. DNA. The first thing to know is that we're made up of DNA. DNA is a molecule that resides in us and encodes all our genetic information. We can think of it as containing all the instructions for how to make a human being.

2. Genes. DNA is composed of genes. Genes are segments of DNA that give humans form and/or function. Genes are also passed on from one parent to their child.

3. Allele. An allele is an alternative form of a gene. A variant. For example, different eye colors (e.g. blue, brown).

4. Genome. A person's genome is all the genetic info in a single person. This is all the DNA in a person.

Usually when we refer to DNA, we're talking about the DNA in a person's chromosomes aka chromosomal DNA. But there's also what's called mitochondrial DNA. That is, DNA in a person's mitochondria as well.

There are further distinctions but this should suffice for our purposes.

At any rate, a person's genome would include all the DNA.

5. Population. A population is all the organisms in a given set that can interbreed with one another. Actually, this is a very basic definition. It isn't perfect by any means, and debatable. But we'll just stick with this for now.

6. Evolution. A basic definition of evolution is a change in the frequencies of genes/alleles in a given population. Again, somewhat debatable, or at least requiring more elaboration, but we'll move on.

7. According to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, there are at least five factors that can influence the frequency of the genes/alleles in a population:

a. Natural selection. This is based on fitness. This is when the fitter or fittest individuals of a population survive (e.g. thick coated foxes are more fit to survive in the Arctic than thin coated foxes), pass on their genes/alleles, and thus their genes/alleles become more frequent in a population.

b. Sexual selection. This is based on sexual attractiveness. This is when the more sexually attractive individuals of a population mate and have the most offspring, thus passing on their genes/alleles, and thus their genes/alleles become more frequent in a population.

c. Gene migration. This is based on movement. This is when new individuals with new genes/alleles migrate into or out of another population, thus changing the frequency of genes/alleles in a population.

d. Genetic drift. This is based on chance. This is when random chance events (e.g. bugs getting stepped on, floods wiping out half the population) lead to changes in the frequency of genes/alleles in a population.

e. Mutations. This is based on anomalies in the genetic code. This is when mistakes in DNA lead to new genes/alleles.

7. Equilibrium. Specifically, Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. A population is said to be in (Hardy-Weinberg) equilibrium when none of the previously mentioned factors are in operation. It also assumes all individuals in a given population capable of breeding are breeding and each produces the same number of offspring.

That is, natural selection is not at work. Sexual selection is completely random. There are no new migrants into or out of a population. There is a huge population size in order to moot random chance events affecting the frequency of genes/alleles in a population. Finally, no mutations ever occur.

8. Finally, as the cornerstone of population genetics, we have what's called the Hardy-Weinberg equation. The equation is: p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1.

We can think the equation in the following way.

Consider three basic types of genes/alleles. Say we have XX genes/alles representing dominant genes/alleles, xx representing recessive genes/alleles, and Xx representing mixed dominant and recessive genes/alleles.

Accordingly, the "p2" in the equation refers to what's called homozygous dominant genes/alleles. The "q2" refers to what's called homozygous recessive genes/alleles. And the "2pq" refers to what's called heterozygous genes/alleles.

If we know 40% of a given population posses homozygous dominant genes/alleles, then we know p2 = 0.4.

If p2 = 0.4, then p = 0.63 (approx).

That means q = 1 - 0.63 = 0.37.

While q2 = 0.137.

And 2pq = 0.466.

Thus, since we know p2 = 0.4, 2pq = 0.466, and q2 = 0.137, then we know 40% of the population possesses homozygous dominant genes (e.g. XX), 46.6% of the population possesses heterozygous genes/alles (e.g. Xx), and 13.7% of the population possesses homozygous recessive genes/alleles.

Bayesian statistics

I'm familiar with general statistics, but I'm no expert in Bayesian statistics. So perhaps I'm mistaken in what I'm about to say.

Also, I should say, I'm by no means against the use of Bayesian statistics. In fact, I think it has great value in certain apologetic contexts.

However, isn't one limitation of Bayesian statistics the presumption that the Bayesian statistician is able to assess the probabilities of a particular theory from a completely objective, impartial, and almost omniscient sort of a perspective or standpoint? As if one could comprehensively evaluate a theory on its own merits or demerits, as well as any and all unknown variables in or related to the theory?

But in practice, isn't it more often the case that one has to assess the probabilities of a particular theory in relation to competing theories?

Physics on the wane

Steve Hays recently made the following point, with which I'd agree:

Physicists have a reputation for being the smartest scientists. Smarter than biologists. That's ironic since biology is far more varied and complicated than physics, so–if anything–you'd expect great biologists to be smarter than great physicists.

Just to add to Steve's thoughts:

1. I suppose some of this is self-perpetuated by physicists as a community. For example, people like Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann seem to have incessantly talked about how smart they were or are.

2. Plus, I think the most impressive scientific discoveries in the first half or two-thirds of the 20th century, certainly to the public if not also impressive in their own right, have largely been in physics (e.g. Bohr's model of the atom, Einstein's theories of relativity, the big bang theory, QM).

3. Not to mention the technological applications in the wake of these discoveries in physics (e.g. nuclear weapons, spaceflight, maybe modern computers to an extent - although I think computers are probably better attributed to mathematicians such as those who served as code crackers in WW2).

4. All this presumably gives the public the impression that physicists are like modern wizards (e.g. able to unlock the inner workings of the atom to harness nuclear energy).

5. Related, I've also read JFK's administration really pushed science, math, and engineering on the American public mainly in order to compete with the Soviet Union in the space race (e.g. to land a man on the moon). I could be wrong, of course, but I assume this would positively affect the perception of these fields in the minds of most of the public, if not also make the public think these are the fields all the really smart students should strive for.

6. However, as we know, it seems there haven't been as many momentous moments in physics in recent years. Today some even joke physics is far too speculative (e.g. string theory, multiverse).

7. My impression is biology started really taking off as a field around the time when physics began to wane, say, around the middle of the 20th century. Such as with physicist Erwin Schrödinger's What Is Life? series of lectures. And especially with the discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick. Crick himself of course was a physicist turned biologist.

From DNA, we learned about genes, chromosomes, etc., at least on levels deeper than Mendelian genetics.

This coincided with medical discoveries and applications like Fleming's discovery of penicillin as an antibiotic.

Likewise, people began to apply mathematics to biology (e.g. population genetics - which with Darwinism and genetics now form the neo-Darwinian synthesis).

In our time we've had the sequencing of the human genome, among other genomes. And there still seem to be so many discoveries awaiting scientists working in biology or related fields (e.g. biochemistry, pharmaceuticals).

In any case, perhaps future generations who have lived through this era where it seems physics is waning while biology is waxing or on the rise will have a different impression than previous generations who have lived through the apogee of physics.

8. For better or for worse, many smart people primarily chase the money. For instance, rather than going for a PhD in something they could do like physics, and hoping for an academic career, some people decide instead to stop at a bachelor's degree in order to try their hand working for a large company in Silicon Valley like Google or Pixar. Of course, one can still do significant research at these companies, but is the opportunity cost vs return worth it for them?

9. I suppose the truth or at least in the direction of the truth is that the smartest people are those who are fluent in abstract and analytical reasoning and able to apply it to whatever field they're interested in (e.g. theology, philosophy, mathematics).

10. By the way, I think William Dembski, for one, who I'm sure could've done physics if he wanted to, but instead chose to apply himself more to the biological sciences side of ID, is considerably smarter than physicists like Victor Stenger or Lawrence Krauss. I think it might even be arguable Dembski is on par with Stephen Hawking or Roger Penrose. Of course, Dembski gets such a bad wrap due to his Christian beliefs.

Thursday, July 3, 2014

Is it always wrong for a man to hit a woman?

1. In general, I take it that it goes without saying a guy's role is to protect the women in their care (e.g. mothers, sisters, wives, daughters).

I suppose this can in some situations extend to other women not directly under a man's care. For example, a man could intervene if he sees a woman getting attacked by another man.

Or, maybe, although care should be taken here, if he knows his neighbor is a wife-beater.

2. However, what if another woman is attacking a man's wife or mother or sister or daughter?

It may depend on the way she's attacking his loved one. Like can he step in and hold the other woman back solely by his strength? If so, then this may be the most viable course of action.

But what if the other woman is attacking his loved one such that he can't hold her back by non-violent means? It seems to me the man would be justified in hitting this other woman to protect his wife or mother or sister or daughter.

3. Some say a man shouldn't ever hit a woman because women are physically weaker than men. That's true in general.

But it's possible some women are stronger than some men. What if a female MMA fighter or wrestler or the like is pounding on a scrawny or skinny guy? Can he hit her back in self-defense?

4. Also, what if a woman is wielding a weapon like a knife against a guy who doesn't have any weapon? What if she's waving the weapon near his face and it looks like she'll cut him? Is he still not allowed to hit her?

5. It's usually significantly frowned upon if a guy is sucker punched, or if he's kicked in-between the legs. For whatever reason, these are usually off-limits, even, it seems, in street fights.

What if a woman sucker punches a guy, or kicks him in-between the legs? Can a guy hit her in retaliation? Or should he simply take it in, and eat her sucker punch or kick in the groin "like a man"?

6. What if a man is up against more than one woman on his own, say, for instance, a gang of women who clearly intend to assault him or rape him? Can he defend himself?

7. What if he faces a group of armed female looters attempting to rob his store like many Korean-Americans faced in Los Angeles in the Rodney King riots?

8. Short of hitting a woman, can a man push or slap a woman if, say, she repeatedly and publicly berates him, insults him, disrespects him, even attempts to instigate other men to attack him such as lying about him and saying he tried to steal her purse or rape her, and the like, even though he's never wronged her? (Of course, if other men are foolish enough to jump in at her instigation, then it may not be realistic for one man to go up against a group of men.)

Wednesday, July 9, 2014

I, robot

Richard Dawkins once said:

Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

Imagine a genius inventor is able to manufacture a human android. Say an android like David 8 in Ridley Scott's Prometheus. But far better (e.g. sans white colored blood, etc.). Indistinguishable from an actual human being.

Of course, one could ask, is David a "living" organism? But given the beliefs and worldview of someone like Richard Dawkins or Jerry Coyne (e.g. atheism, materialism, reductionism, neo-Darwinism), would there be a substantial difference between David and a living, breathing human being like Dawkins?

If so, what would it be?

If not, then how would an evolutionist like Dawkins differentiate between a "living" human being which evolved and David who is an artificial creation? Say the inventor is the only other who knows and he's not telling! Neither is David.

After all, both appear designed. But real humans (e.g. Dawkins) have come to appear designed due to unguided and purposeless natural processes, whereas artificial humans like David have come to appear designed due to the guided and purposeful intelligence of a genius inventor. That is, real humans have the appearance of design, while artificial humans have in fact been designed.

This scenario may sound far-fetched to many people; it's in the realm of science fiction, naught else. Maybe so. But given Dawkins' worldview, why not...someday? Indeed, Craig Venter "created" artificial life not too long ago. Apparently Venter had even placed a genetic signature or watermark in his synthetic life in order to make it known it was his creation. Not unlike, perhaps, Mr. Weyland placing "W" on the fingertip of his creation David in Prometheus:

So, short of some sort of a watermark or signature in the cell, if it's not possible to distinguish between a real human being and an artificially designed human being, then how could we tell one did indeed evolve according to unguided and purposeless natural processes, whereas the other was intelligently designed?

If we can't, then an outsider might as well conclude David evolved according to evolutionary theory, whereas Dawkins was designed by a genius inventor. But we don't really know because we can't distinguish between the two.

As such, on what grounds could Dawkins aka the Dawkbot say humans merely have the "appearance" of design rather than actual design? Couldn't it go either way? If so, then Dawkins shouldn't be so quick to pronounce the appearance of design over actual intelligent design.

A quick and dirty intro to ID

This is just a quick and dirty intro to Intelligent Design (ID).

Obviously, I think it'd be best for people to go straight to the source and read about ID directly from websites like Uncommon Descent and Evolution News & Views. To say nothing of the plethora of published works by ID theorists William Dembski, Stephen Meyer, Michael Behe, et al.

However, since I've had friends and others ask me to explain ID, I thought it'd be worth summarizing what I think is the main point of ID to them.


Francis Crick, who co-discovered the structure of DNA along with James Watson, once said:

Biologists must constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved.

By the same token, the militant atheist and evolutionist Richard Dawkins has said:

Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

As ID theorists have pointed out, the key word is "appearance." Individuals like Dawkins believe living organisms merely "appear" to have been designed when in fact they are anything but. They believe living organisms have instead come into being via unguided and purposeless natural processes. And that these natural processes are best explicated in neo-Darwinism.

By contrast, a reason ID theorists use the term "intelligent" in ID is because they wish to distinguish between an unguided and purposeless natural process vs a guided and purposeful process best explained by intelligent agency.

Now, virtually everyone recognizes there are many things in this universe which look like they're designed. Obviously we know things like computers, cars, and buildings have been engineered by humans. Likewise, various works of art, literature, music, movies, computer games. Similarly, we could say many inorganic materials like various plastics have been artificially designed. We could further include nanoparticles and arguably the synthetic elements in the Periodic Table too. Almost everyone including atheists like Dawkins would probably agree most if not all of these have been designed by intelligent agents i.e. humans.

But when it comes to living organisms, while everyone agrees life looks designed, atheists like Dawkins think actual design is an illusion. (I suppose in some ways similar to how some atheists think of consciousness.)

Worse, they practically become apoplectic if anyone so much as hints the design may not be an illusion but may in fact be actual design by an actual intelligence of some sort. That it may not have been unguided and purposeless after all. Or to put it another, if anyone casts doubt on the neo-Darwinian paradigm.

As an aside, it often seems as if it's all but a thought-crime to question Darwinism. This isn't hyperbolic language for effect, I don't think. There have been very real and unfortunate consequences. For example, many people's reputations have been unfairly marred. Many have lost their jobs and thus livelihoods and/or been blacklisted from future jobs due to their dissent from Darwinism. For starters, check out what happened to Richard Sternberg and Guillermo Gonzalez.

Getting back to the point, given living organisms appear designed, the next logical question should be: are living organisms, in fact, designed? Not: how or by what mechanisms have living organisms come to appear designed? Nor: who or what designed living organisms? (Dawkins, Coyne, Wolpert, and their kind react as equally irked by theistic evolution as they do by ID theory.) Yet neo-Darwinists often get ahead of themselves and confuse and/or conflate these and other questions and their related issues. They proceed, for example, to shout down ID theorists as Young Earth Creationists (YEC) in disguise, even though it's clear to anyone with a modicum of fair-mindedness and an ounce of familiarity with the movement that ID most decidedly is not. (Sometimes to the chagrin of many actual YECs!) Of course, these are good questions to ask, and questions which we should ask. But my immediate point is ID doesn't strictly speaking deal with these questions, not as their first port of call.

So, how can we tell if a living organism is truly designed? This is where intelligence comes in. Indeed, intelligence is what makes the crucial difference between the mere appearance of design vs actual design. In other words, there's a significant distinction between unintelligent design vs intelligent design, for unintelligent design means an unguided and purposeless natural process (i.e. neo-Darwinian theory), while intelligent design is, as I've already noted, the reverse.

Specifically, according to ID theorists, intelligence is a causal power that can arrange and adapt means to bring about teleological ends. This stands in distinction both to brute necessity which does not arrange or adapt means as well as to random chance which is not teleological or goal-oriented.

What's more, ID theorists have come up with ways to detect intelligence. I think Dembski's scheme is the most analytically rigorous. It'd be beyond the scope of this post to go into detail, but Dembski does point out three marks of intelligence: contingency, complexity, and specificity. By contingency he simply means if an object or event is unnecessary or, if you like, optional; if it occurred, even though it need not have occurred. Complexity refers to the fact that an object or event is difficult to reproduce by chance alone. And specificity is if an object or event exhibits an independent pattern. Dembski terms his theory of intelligence detection, specified complexity, and argues only intelligence can originate or generate specified complexity when prior to intelligence there was no specified complexity. Note this isn't the same as unintelligent natural processes making use of specified complexity.

If specified complexity is successful, then at a minimum it means we have sound and reasonable scientific and mathematical criteria to detect intelligent design in nature.

Parsing Parsons

Keith Parsons recently wrote:

neurons are classical not quantum objects

What's Parsons attempting to say here? Is he referring to classical mechanics in physics as opposed to quantum mechanics?

If not, I'm not sure what he's talking about.

But if so, then presumably he's attempting to say something like (in his own clumsy way) the physiology of neurons or neurophysiology isn't best explained by quantum mechanics, but rather by classical mechanics?

If so, for starters we can say that, generally speaking, quantum effects are more pronounced the smaller an object is. But just because neurons (i.e. nerve cells) aren't, say, atomic or subatomic particles doesn't necessarily mean QM has zero effect on neurons. A quantum effect could still be present but simply not observable. At least not by our current instruments or technology.

Further, neurons are obviously comprised of smaller constituents which could be measurably subject to QM (e.g. perhaps some proteins, perhaps the electron transport chain in the mitochondrial membrane).

Besides, isn't Parsons a reductionist who also subscribes to emergent phenomena in their lower level constituents? If so, wouldn't Parsons think lower level constituents in neurons could influence the higher level neurons themselves in some fashion?

Also, even if we don't head down to a low level like the atomic or subatomic level but instead stick with the molecular or cellular level, we know nerve signals are transmitted via nerve cells or neurons electrochemically (i.e. via electrical action potentials and chemical neurotransmitters). And I don't see why certain events in this electrochemical transmission process between neurons couldn't be explicated in terms of QM? (Well, maybe only if the time scale isn't short enough.)

Of course, none of this is at all to suggest I agree with the position that QM fully explains consciousness. Rather, I'm just responding to Parsons on his own terms.

This article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy may also be of interest to some.

Background to pop gen

Here's some quick and dirty background info for those curious about population genetics. It'll be simplified for wider popular appeal, but hopefully not overly simplified. I won't talk about population genetics itself, per se, since that'd be a bit too time-consuming for me to provide right now. But the background should provide enough knowledge to get people started on learning about population genetics on their own.

1. DNA. The first thing to know is that we're made up of DNA. DNA is a molecule that resides in us and encodes all our genetic information. We can think of it as containing all the instructions for how to make a human being.

2. Genes. DNA is composed of genes. Genes are segments of DNA that give humans form and/or function. Genes are also passed on from one parent to their child.

3. Allele. An allele is an alternative form of a gene. A variant. For example, different eye colors (e.g. blue, brown).

4. Genome. A person's genome is all the genetic info in a single person. This is all the DNA in a person.

Usually when we refer to DNA, we're talking about the DNA in a person's chromosomes aka chromosomal DNA. But there's also what's called mitochondrial DNA. That is, DNA in a person's mitochondria as well.

There are further distinctions but this should suffice for our purposes.

At any rate, a person's genome would include all the DNA.

5. Population. A population is all the organisms in a given set that can interbreed with one another. Actually, this is a very basic definition. It isn't perfect by any means, and debatable. But we'll just stick with this for now.

6. Evolution. A basic definition of evolution is a change in the frequencies of genes/alleles in a given population. Again, somewhat debatable, or at least requiring more elaboration, but we'll move on.

7. According to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, there are at least five factors that can influence the frequency of the genes/alleles in a population:

a. Natural selection. This is based on fitness. This is when the fitter or fittest individuals of a population survive (e.g. thick coated foxes are more fit to survive in the Arctic than thin coated foxes), pass on their genes/alleles, and thus their genes/alleles become more frequent in a population.

b. Sexual selection. This is based on sexual attractiveness. This is when the more sexually attractive individuals of a population mate and have the most offspring, thus passing on their genes/alleles, and thus their genes/alleles become more frequent in a population.

c. Gene migration. This is based on movement. This is when new individuals with new genes/alleles migrate into or out of another population, thus changing the frequency of genes/alleles in a population.

d. Genetic drift. This is based on chance. This is when random chance events (e.g. bugs getting stepped on, floods wiping out half the population) lead to changes in the frequency of genes/alleles in a population.

e. Mutations. This is based on anomalies in the genetic code. This is when mistakes in DNA lead to new genes/alleles.

7. Equilibrium. Specifically, Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. A population is said to be in (Hardy-Weinberg) equilibrium when none of the previously mentioned factors are in operation. It also assumes all individuals in a given population capable of breeding are breeding and each produces the same number of offspring.

That is, natural selection is not at work. Sexual selection is completely random. There are no new migrants into or out of a population. There is a huge population size in order to moot random chance events affecting the frequency of genes/alleles in a population. Finally, no mutations ever occur.

8. Finally, as the cornerstone of population genetics, we have what's called the Hardy-Weinberg equation. The equation is: p2 + 2pq + q2 = 1.

We can think the equation in the following way.

Consider three basic types of genes/alleles. Say we have XX genes/alles representing dominant genes/alleles, xx representing recessive genes/alleles, and Xx representing mixed dominant and recessive genes/alleles.

Accordingly, the "p2" in the equation refers to what's called homozygous dominant genes/alleles. The "q2" refers to what's called homozygous recessive genes/alleles. And the "2pq" refers to what's called heterozygous genes/alleles.

If we know 40% of a given population posses homozygous dominant genes/alleles, then we know p2 = 0.4.

If p2 = 0.4, then p = 0.63 (approx).

That means q = 1 - 0.63 = 0.37.

While q2 = 0.137.

And 2pq = 0.466.

Thus, since we know p2 = 0.4, 2pq = 0.466, and q2 = 0.137, then we know 40% of the population possesses homozygous dominant genes (e.g. XX), 46.6% of the population possesses heterozygous genes/alles (e.g. Xx), and 13.7% of the population possesses homozygous recessive genes/alleles.

Bayesian statistics

I'm familiar with general statistics, but I'm no expert in Bayesian statistics. So perhaps I'm mistaken in what I'm about to say.

Also, I should say, I'm by no means against the use of Bayesian statistics. In fact, I think it has great value in certain apologetic contexts.

However, isn't one limitation of Bayesian statistics the presumption that the Bayesian statistician is able to assess the probabilities of a particular theory from a completely objective, impartial, and almost omniscient sort of a perspective or standpoint? As if one could comprehensively evaluate a theory on its own merits or demerits, as well as any and all unknown variables in or related to the theory?

But in practice, isn't it more often the case that one has to assess the probabilities of a particular theory in relation to competing theories?

Physics on the wane

Steve Hays recently made the following point, with which I'd agree:

Physicists have a reputation for being the smartest scientists. Smarter than biologists. That's ironic since biology is far more varied and complicated than physics, so–if anything–you'd expect great biologists to be smarter than great physicists.

Just to add to Steve's thoughts:

1. I suppose some of this is self-perpetuated by physicists as a community. For example, people like Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann seem to have incessantly talked about how smart they were or are.

2. Plus, I think the most impressive scientific discoveries in the first half or two-thirds of the 20th century, certainly to the public if not also impressive in their own right, have largely been in physics (e.g. Bohr's model of the atom, Einstein's theories of relativity, the big bang theory, QM).

3. Not to mention the technological applications in the wake of these discoveries in physics (e.g. nuclear weapons, spaceflight, maybe modern computers to an extent - although I think computers are probably better attributed to mathematicians such as those who served as code crackers in WW2).

4. All this presumably gives the public the impression that physicists are like modern wizards (e.g. able to unlock the inner workings of the atom to harness nuclear energy).

5. Related, I've also read JFK's administration really pushed science, math, and engineering on the American public mainly in order to compete with the Soviet Union in the space race (e.g. to land a man on the moon). I could be wrong, of course, but I assume this would positively affect the perception of these fields in the minds of most of the public, if not also make the public think these are the fields all the really smart students should strive for.

6. However, as we know, it seems there haven't been as many momentous moments in physics in recent years. Today some even joke physics is far too speculative (e.g. string theory, multiverse).

7. My impression is biology started really taking off as a field around the time when physics began to wane, say, around the middle of the 20th century. Such as with physicist Erwin Schrödinger's What Is Life? series of lectures. And especially with the discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick. Crick himself of course was a physicist turned biologist.

From DNA, we learned about genes, chromosomes, etc., at least on levels deeper than Mendelian genetics.

This coincided with medical discoveries and applications like Fleming's discovery of penicillin as an antibiotic.

Likewise, people began to apply mathematics to biology (e.g. population genetics - which with Darwinism and genetics now form the neo-Darwinian synthesis).

In our time we've had the sequencing of the human genome, among other genomes. And there still seem to be so many discoveries awaiting scientists working in biology or related fields (e.g. biochemistry, pharmaceuticals).

In any case, perhaps future generations who have lived through this era where it seems physics is waning while biology is waxing or on the rise will have a different impression than previous generations who have lived through the apogee of physics.

8. For better or for worse, many smart people primarily chase the money. For instance, rather than going for a PhD in something they could do like physics, and hoping for an academic career, some people decide instead to stop at a bachelor's degree in order to try their hand working for a large company in Silicon Valley like Google or Pixar. Of course, one can still do significant research at these companies, but is the opportunity cost vs return worth it for them?

9. I suppose the truth or at least in the direction of the truth is that the smartest people are those who are fluent in abstract and analytical reasoning and able to apply it to whatever field they're interested in (e.g. theology, philosophy, mathematics).

10. By the way, I think William Dembski, for one, who I'm sure could've done physics if he wanted to, but instead chose to apply himself more to the biological sciences side of ID, is considerably smarter than physicists like Victor Stenger or Lawrence Krauss. I think it might even be arguable Dembski is on par with Stephen Hawking or Roger Penrose. Of course, Dembski gets such a bad wrap due to his Christian beliefs.

Thursday, July 3, 2014

Is it always wrong for a man to hit a woman?

1. In general, I take it that it goes without saying a guy's role is to protect the women in their care (e.g. mothers, sisters, wives, daughters).

I suppose this can in some situations extend to other women not directly under a man's care. For example, a man could intervene if he sees a woman getting attacked by another man.

Or, maybe, although care should be taken here, if he knows his neighbor is a wife-beater.

2. However, what if another woman is attacking a man's wife or mother or sister or daughter?

It may depend on the way she's attacking his loved one. Like can he step in and hold the other woman back solely by his strength? If so, then this may be the most viable course of action.

But what if the other woman is attacking his loved one such that he can't hold her back by non-violent means? It seems to me the man would be justified in hitting this other woman to protect his wife or mother or sister or daughter.

3. Some say a man shouldn't ever hit a woman because women are physically weaker than men. That's true in general.

But it's possible some women are stronger than some men. What if a female MMA fighter or wrestler or the like is pounding on a scrawny or skinny guy? Can he hit her back in self-defense?

4. Also, what if a woman is wielding a weapon like a knife against a guy who doesn't have any weapon? What if she's waving the weapon near his face and it looks like she'll cut him? Is he still not allowed to hit her?

5. It's usually significantly frowned upon if a guy is sucker punched, or if he's kicked in-between the legs. For whatever reason, these are usually off-limits, even, it seems, in street fights.

What if a woman sucker punches a guy, or kicks him in-between the legs? Can a guy hit her in retaliation? Or should he simply take it in, and eat her sucker punch or kick in the groin "like a man"?

6. What if a man is up against more than one woman on his own, say, for instance, a gang of women who clearly intend to assault him or rape him? Can he defend himself?

7. What if he faces a group of armed female looters attempting to rob his store like many Korean-Americans faced in Los Angeles in the Rodney King riots?

8. Short of hitting a woman, can a man push or slap a woman if, say, she repeatedly and publicly berates him, insults him, disrespects him, even attempts to instigate other men to attack him such as lying about him and saying he tried to steal her purse or rape her, and the like, even though he's never wronged her? (Of course, if other men are foolish enough to jump in at her instigation, then it may not be realistic for one man to go up against a group of men.)